From OpenClaw to Ironclad: How the “Red Wedding” Inspired Me to Audit My Server

I spent the last 72 hours watching the OpenClaw (formerly ClawdBot/Moltbot) disaster unfold on X.

If you missed it, security researchers dubbed it the “Red Wedding of Vibe Coding.” Thousands of autonomous AI agents were hacked because the developers made critical security errors: they trusted “localhost” connections blindly, stored API keys in plaintext, and allowed unverified malware into their app store.

As I watched people lose their API keys and root access, I stopped laughing and started sweating.

I run my own automation infrastructure—specifically n8n hosted on an Oracle Cloud VM. While n8n is professional software and OpenClaw was a “vibe coding” experiment, the underlying risks are the same. We are running powerful tools on cloud servers that hold the keys to our digital lives.

So, I decided to perform a Security Audit on my own infrastructure to see if I was vulnerable to the same exploits that took down OpenClaw. Here is what I found, and how you can check your own server.

1. The “Two Doors” Problem (Network Security)

The biggest failure of OpenClaw was the “Welcome Mat” vulnerability. Users installed the bot on cloud servers, and because of a configuration error, the bot thought everyone on the internet was a “local” user, bypassing the password screen.

I use Cloudflare Tunnel to access my n8n instance. This creates a secure, encrypted tunnel so I don’t have to open ports.

But here is the catch I discovered: Even if you use a secure tunnel, you might still have the “Back Door” open.

If you set up Cloudflare Tunnel but forget to close the firewall port on your host (Oracle/AWS), hackers can bypass Cloudflare entirely and hit your server IP directly.

The Audit:

I logged into my Oracle Cloud Console to check my VCN Security Lists (Firewall rules).
I was looking for Port 5678 (the default n8n port).

• The Fear: Seeing Ingress Rule: Allow 0.0.0.0/0 on Port 5678.
• The Reality: The list was empty! Oracle blocks traffic by default.

The Lesson: I verified that my n8n instance is only accessible via the Cloudflare Tunnel. If I try to visit http://[MY-IP]:5678, it times out. This protects me from the exact vulnerability that killed OpenClaw.

2. The SSH Trap (Root Access)

OpenClaw gave hackers root access because of bad auth. But what about my server itself?

I noticed that Port 22 (SSH) was open to the internet (0.0.0.0/0). This is standard for managing servers, but it is dangerous if you are using password authentication. Bots are constantly scanning Port 22 trying to brute-force passwords like admin123.

I needed to know if my server allowed passwords, or if it enforced SSH Keys (files) only.

The Audit:

I learned a new trick to find the “Truth” of a server’s configuration. Instead of just reading the config file (which can be confusing with comments), I ran this command:

sudo sshd -T | grep passwordauthentication

• The Result: passwordauthentication no

The Victory: Even though I hadn’t explicitly configured this myself, Oracle Cloud images disable password authentication by default. My server creates a “Keys Only” club. No password guessing allowed.

3. Application Security (n8n vs. OpenClaw)

This audit highlighted the difference between “Vibe Coding” (OpenClaw) and mature engineering (n8n).

Storage of Secrets:

• OpenClaw: Stored API keys in a config.json file in plaintext. If a hacker read the file, they stole the keys.
• n8n: Encrypts credentials using a unique encryption key located in .n8n/config. Even if a hacker dumps the database, they cannot read my OpenAI keys without also stealing the encryption key.

Authentication:

• OpenClaw: Tried to be smart by checking IP addresses (localhost).
• n8n: Uses standard session-based authentication. It doesn’t care where you come from; you must provide a username and password (or pass through OAuth).

The Takeaway: Stick to mature, battle-tested software for your critical infrastructure. New “AI Agent” tools are exciting, but they often lack basic security features.

4. The Final Shield: Cloudflare Access

While my audit showed I was safe, I realized I could do better.

Cloudflare Tunnel exposes your app to a public URL (e.g., n8n.mahdihasan.com). While n8n has a login screen, exposing any login screen to the public internet invites bots to hammer it.

The Fix: I ensured Cloudflare Access (Zero Trust) was enabled.

Now, when I visit my URL, I don’t see n8n. I see a Cloudflare login page asking for my email. Only after I verify my identity does Cloudflare let me through to the n8n login screen.

It is a “Double Lock” system.

Conclusion: Autonomy Requires Security

The OpenClaw disaster was a wake-up call. We are entering an era where we hand over our “keys to the kingdom” (API keys, root access) to AI agents.

If you are self-hosting tools—whether it’s OpenClaw, n8n, or the next big AI thing—you cannot rely on “Default Settings.”

My Security Checklist for Self-Hosters:

1. Block all Inbound Ports (Use Tunnels like Tailscale or Cloudflare).
2. Disable SSH Password Auth (Keys only).
3. Use Zero Trust Middleware (Cloudflare Access) to hide login screens.
4. Rotate API Keys regularly.

The lobsters might be molting, but my server is staying ironclad.